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Synthetic Users Incident Response Plan (IRP)
Version: 1.2
Effective Date: 16 July 2025
Last Updated: March 25, 2026
Owner: CTO — Artur Ventura
Approved By: CTO — Artur Ventura
Change History
| Version | Date | Author | Changes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | July 16, 2025 | Security & Compliance Lead | Initial release |
| 1.2 | March 25, 2026 | Artur Ventura, CTO | Added AI/GenAI incident classification and response procedures (Section 7); added external threat intelligence sources (Section 5); updated scope to explicitly include AI/GenAI systems; added JPMC client notification obligations; updated related documents. Per JPMC SCA CRA 14.1.1. |
1. Purpose
This plan establishes Synthetic Users’ structured approach to detecting, responding to, containing, and recovering from security incidents that could compromise data confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
2. Scope
This plan applies to all Synthetic Users systems, employees, contractors, and third parties handling company or customer data.
It covers cybersecurity events, data breaches, unauthorized access, system compromises, and other incidents affecting business continuity or data protection obligations.
This plan explicitly covers AI/GenAI systems, including incidents involving prompt injection, data leakage via model outputs, model misuse, abnormal model behaviour, and third-party LLM provider events. AI/GenAI incidents are subject to the same classification, escalation, testing, and root cause analysis requirements as all other incidents.
3. Roles and Responsibilities
| Role | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Incident Response Lead (IRL) | Coordinates all response activities, approves external communications, and reports to the CTO. |
| Security Engineer / IT Team | Investigates, contains, and eradicates threats; preserves forensic evidence. |
| Legal & Compliance | Ensures adherence to GDPR and breach notification obligations. |
| Communications Lead | Manages internal and external messaging, including client and public statements. |
| Executive Team | Provides strategic oversight and approves public disclosures. |
Contact details for all roles are maintained in the internal Security Runbook.
4. Phases of Incident Response
4.1 Detection and Identification
- Immediately log and triage all suspected incidents via the internal incident tracking system.
- Validate the event using system logs, intrusion detection alerts, or anomaly reports.
- Classify severity (Low, Medium, High, Critical) based on scope and potential impact.
- Notify the Incident Response Lead within 1 hour of detection.
4.2 Containment
Short-Term Containment
- Disconnect or isolate affected systems from networks.
- Revoke compromised credentials or access tokens.
- Capture volatile evidence (e.g., memory dumps, logs) before system reboot.
Long-Term Containment
- Apply temporary security controls (e.g., firewall rules, access restrictions) to prevent spread.
- Initiate monitoring for related suspicious activity.
4.3 Investigation and Assessment
- Conduct forensic analysis to determine the cause, entry point, and scope.
- Preserve all evidence securely for legal or compliance purposes.
- Document each action in the Incident Report Log.
- Assess affected data types (personal, confidential, operational).
- Engage Legal & Compliance for impact classification under GDPR or other applicable laws.
4.4 Eradication and Recovery
- Eliminate malicious code, unauthorized access, or misconfigurations.
- Validate that compromised accounts and systems are fully remediated.
- Restore systems from verified clean backups.
- Conduct integrity checks before reconnecting systems to production.
- Strengthen controls that failed (patches, access restrictions, monitoring).
4.5 Notification and Compliance
- Notify affected customers (including the Affected Organization) without undue delay and within legal timeframes (e.g., 72 hours under GDPR).
- Provide clear, factual information about:
- Nature and scope of the incident
- Data involved
- Mitigation measures taken
- Recommended actions for affected parties
- Coordinate regulatory notifications through Legal & Compliance.
- JPMC client notification: If the incident affects JPMC data, JPMC systems, or services provided under the JPMC engagement, notify JPMC within 72 hours of confirming the incident. Provide JPMC with incident scope, data involved, containment status, and remediation timeline. Follow up with a written post-incident report within 10 business days of closure.
- Maintain documentation of all communications for audit and compliance review.
4.6 Post-Incident Review
- Conduct a Post-Incident Review Meeting within 10 business days of closure.
- Analyze incident root cause, timeline, and response effectiveness.
- Record lessons learned and assign owners for remediation tasks.
- Update relevant policies (Access Control, Encryption, Password Management, etc.) based on findings.
- File the finalized Incident Report in the Security Repository.
5. Continuous Improvement
- Perform at least one tabletop incident simulation per year to test this plan. Tabletop scenarios include at least one AI/GenAI-specific scenario annually (e.g., prompt injection, data leakage via LLM output, LLM provider outage).
- Audit incident handling logs quarterly for completeness and accuracy.
- Revise the plan annually or after any major incident, system change, or regulatory update.
5.1 External Threat Intelligence
Synthetic Users actively monitors the following external intelligence sources to stay current on emerging threats and vulnerabilities:
- Cloud provider security advisories — AWS Security Bulletins, Render status and security notifications
- CVE/NVD feeds — National Vulnerability Database for disclosed CVEs affecting dependencies and infrastructure
- Vendor vulnerability disclosures — Security notifications from critical vendors and LLM providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Firebase, Google Workspace)
- Open-source dependency alerts — Dependabot automated alerts for vulnerable open-source packages
- AI/GenAI threat intelligence — OWASP LLM Top 10 updates, emerging prompt injection and model exploitation techniques
Intelligence is triaged by the CTO and Engineering Lead and fed directly into vulnerability management and incident response workflows.
6. Incident Severity Classification
| Severity | Definition | Initial Response Time | Executive Notification |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Active breach or data exfiltration; JPMC data or customer PII confirmed affected; ransomware or total system compromise | Immediate — within 1 hour | CEO + CTO within 1 hour |
| High | Suspected breach; unauthorized access to production systems; AI/GenAI prompt injection with confirmed data leakage | Within 4 hours | CTO within 1 hour; CEO within 4 hours |
| Medium | Anomalous model behaviour; failed injection attempt; access control violation with no confirmed data loss; vendor security advisory requiring action | Within 24 hours | CTO within 4 hours |
| Low | Near-miss event; dependency vulnerability with no active exploitation; policy violation with no security impact | Within 5 business days | Engineering Lead; CTO if recurring |
7. AI/GenAI Incident Response
AI/GenAI incidents are handled under this plan using the same phases (Detection → Containment → Investigation → Eradication → Notification → Post-Incident Review) with the following additional guidance.
7.1 AI/GenAI Incident Types
| Incident Type | Description | Initial Containment Action |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt Injection | A user-crafted input overrides system prompt instructions, potentially exposing system prompt contents, other tenants' data, or executing unauthorized actions | Disable the affected endpoint or feature; rotate affected API keys; preserve prompt and response logs for forensic review |
| Data Leakage via Model Output | LLM output contains data from another tenant's RAG index, from the model's training data, or PII not intentionally included in the prompt | Identify affected sessions; notify affected tenants; review RAG retrieval scope and tenant isolation controls |
| Model Misuse | Platform is used to generate harmful, deceptive, or policy-violating content in violation of the Acceptable Use Policy | Suspend offending account; preserve session logs; review content filtering configuration |
| LLM Provider Security Event | A third-party LLM provider discloses a security breach, data retention issue, or vulnerability affecting API data | Activate LLM Shuffle fallback to alternate provider; obtain written confirmation from provider on data exposure scope; assess DPA compliance |
| Abnormal Model Behaviour | LLM outputs deviate significantly from expected behaviour in ways that suggest model compromise, poisoning, or provider-side incident | Switch affected model to fallback provider via LLM Shuffle; log anomalous outputs; notify provider; notify CTO immediately |
| AI Service Disruption | LLM provider unavailability causes platform degradation for customers including JPMC | Activate fallback provider; communicate estimated resolution to affected customers; notify JPMC if JPMC engagement is affected |
| Prompt/Context Window Exfiltration | Evidence that system prompt contents, JPMC data, or internal context have been extracted by a user or external party | Treat as High/Critical breach; follow full breach response; notify JPMC within 72 hours if JPMC data was involved |
7.2 AI/GenAI Forensic Preservation
When investigating an AI/GenAI incident, the following artefacts must be preserved:
- Full prompt and response logs for the affected session(s), including system prompt and context window contents
- RAG retrieval logs showing which documents were retrieved for the affected query
- LLM provider API request and response metadata (timestamps, model version, token counts)
- Application-level access logs for the affected user/tenant
- Content filtering decisions and any flagged outputs
Logs must be captured before any remediation action that could alter or delete them.
7.3 AI/GenAI Annual Testing
The annual tabletop exercise must include at least one AI/GenAI scenario. Suggested scenarios include:
- A user successfully performs a prompt injection that retrieves another tenant's data
- An LLM provider discloses a security incident affecting API data during an active JPMC engagement
- Abnormal output patterns are detected across multiple research sessions suggesting model-level compromise
Test findings and remediation actions are documented and retained per the Information Governance & Records Management Standard.
8. Related Documents
- SDLC AI/GenAI Addendum — AI/GenAI model lifecycle and security controls including adversarial testing
- AI/GenAI Algorithm Design Document — System architecture and data flow relevant to AI/GenAI forensic investigation
- Third-Party Risk Management Policy — LLM provider risk classification and vendor incident response SLAs
- Access Rights Review Policy — Access control policy referenced in eradication and recovery
- Encryption Policy — Encryption standards relevant to data breach assessment
- Password Management Policy — Credential management referenced in containment
- Business Continuity Plan — Continuity procedures for prolonged AI/GenAI service disruption
- Information Governance & Records Management Standard — Incident record retention requirements